

DIPLOMATIC SPURS

Our Experiences in Santo Domingo

LIEUTENANT COLONEL CHARLES J. MILLER
U. S. Marine Corps

(Continued from February number)

POLICIA NACIONAL DOMINICANA

On April 7, 1917, the Guardia Nacional Dominicana, now designated as the Policia Nacional Dominicana, was organized. Its strength until October, 1922, when definitely fixed by Executive Order at eighty-eight commissioned officers and twelve hundred enlisted men, had been a variable quantity fluctuating with the amount of national funds appropriated for its establishment and upkeep.

The Guardia or Policia when first organized operated under the Department of Interior and Police, but later was assigned to the Brigade for the purpose of organization, training, and military operations. The Department of Interior and Police only retained a nominal control over certain administrative functions relative to appropriations.

During the time the Policia was maintained as an activity of the Military Government, it was officered almost entirely by Marine officers and non-commissioned officers, and commissioned officers and petty officers of the Medical Corps, U. S. Navy. A few of the junior officers and all of the enlisted personnel were Dominicans.

Due to the uncertainty of the duration of the Occupation, the shortage of government funds, and the probable conditions surrounding the withdrawal, the adoption of a well defined, progressive, and permanent program for the organization and training of the Policia was impracticable. Nevertheless, a general scheme for training and organization had for its motive the taking over of the Brigade's duties after the evacuation of Santo Domingo in so far as would be conformable to the Dominican law. Later when the Dominican people signified an intention to accept proposals for the evacuation, a plan was prepared, approved, and placed in operation. The salient features of this plan were as follows:

- (a) The policing of the provinces by the Policia during the year 1923 and the withdrawal of the Brigade to ports of embarkation.
- (b) Progressive training of native officers for duties they would fall heir to and for the gradual assumption of responsibility by carefully regulated steps.
- (c) The establishment of training centers and the intensive training of native officers and enlisted men so as to attain maximum authorized strength by March 1, 1923.
- (d) Prior to the withdrawal of the armed forces, the operation of the Policia under the same distribution that would prevail after the withdrawal.

It was believed, that if the above plan could be carried out in its entirety, some degree of success would be assured to the establishment of a national constabulary force qualified as a relief for the forces of Occupation. This was a paramount military necessity and of prime im-

portance in any policy involving a change of government. A government capable of surviving could not hope to safeguard its integrity without the support of a strong, loyal, and efficient constabulary force.

An adherence to this plan in all items was frustrated shortly after its inception by the installation of the Provisional Government. There was, however, no material interference in the training feature of the plan, which was carried out in the main essentials. Two training centers were established and a course of eight weeks' training was given to the enlisted men, similar in many respects to our recruit training, supplemented by instruction in constabulary duties. A school for native officers was also instituted, comprehensive in character, entailing a few months' course of instruction.

During the time the Policia fell entirely under the jurisdiction of Military Government, its forces were usually stationed by companies in the provincial capitals less detachments at smaller towns and along the Haitian border. Its principal duties were those of a constabulary force, and as such, it was charged with the suppression of outlawry and other crimes, apprehension of fugitives from justice, prevention of smuggling, execution of court orders, care and custody of civil prisoners, and the enforcement of the laws in general. It performed splendid service both independently and in cooperation with the Brigade in the suppression of banditry.

Regardless of the fact that the organization and training of the Policia Nacional Dominicana has been confided solely to the Brigade, and accepted without reservation, the Brigade could not assume the responsibility for its military efficiency. Any attainment towards proficiency was dependent upon time, control, and unity of command. Conditions approaching such an ideal situation did not long prevail. The change in the status of the Military Government, together with the contemplated evacuation of the Occupation, placed the Policia in an insecure position, vulnerable to influences that might affect its morale, and ultimately destroy its efficiency and terminate in disorganization.

From observations of the past, the constitution of a native military force must be viewed in the light of an experiment for such a force, organized, trained and controlled, had never existed. There are no precedents upon which to form a basis for estimating in advance those military assets that might naturally accrue to a force recruited from the native population.

CIVIL PATROLS

The training and employment of civil patrols or guards was not an established practice. As a matter of fact, they were seldom, if rarely resorted to, and then only in cases of emergency. An account of this activity might be dispensed with, yet it may be of conspicuous interest to know, that their organization was frequently advocated by the civil authorities and not infrequently recommended by officers of the Occupation. Moreover, in the few instances where they were employed, when placed under analysis give rise to certain deductions, which constitute a set of rules governing their general use.

As far as can be determined, there was no policy appertaining to the employment of the civil population for purely military reasons. However, some intimation of a radical change in the political situation in Santo Domingo, led the Navy Department in May, 1923, to announce a policy which had for its main object the divorcing of all civil and police functions from the Brigade, and the assumption of these functions by the Policia. This

seemed to cover the problem as far as the Brigade was concerned. The terms, "civil guards" and "civil patrols" are used synonymously, although the former was intended to apply to civilian organizations employed defensively in communities where the absence of the military forces or the numerical weakness of the municipal police did not afford adequate police protection against the descent of the bandit groups upon the more populous districts. While never specifically organized for this purpose, they were, however, employed offensively against the bandit groups. Therefore, the term civil patrols would appear to be more appropriate.

The employment of the native population by a force in occupation, as an improvisation, for police or military purposes should ordinarily be condemned and viewed as an undesirable recourse to means that properly belong to other agencies. Numerous disadvantages inseparable to the formation of civil patrols can only be neutralized by the most inflexible supervision. Where such forces were authorized to operate either independently or in concert with the forces of the Occupation, the Military Govern-

ment public. If the Military Government desired to adhere to a policy which had for its purpose the divorcement of the civil authorities and politicians from all military connections, then the sanctioning of civil patrols was in direct discord with such a policy. Based on this idea, the leadership of a civil organization, possessing military characteristics, might be expected to develop certain political aspects. The command of a large patrol would naturally enhance the prestige of the leader, and in a country where politics play a predominant part in the lives of the people, the supposition was, that the leader would be disposed to use his influence for political aggrandizement.

One example will serve to illustrate some of the disadvantages outlined above. A Dominican of considerable prominence in the Province of Seibo was authorized to collect about fifty native followers to operate against the bandits. This band was armed, and directed to destroy a certain notorious bandit leader and his followers. Outside of securing information, the band rendered no service whatsoever to the Occupation. On the contrary these irregulars did irreparable damage, and were an actual



THE RECEPTORIA, SAN DOMINGO CITY, D. R., NOW REMODELED, PRESIDENT'S PALACE

ment was accountable for their acts, and thereby became the likely recipient of severe censure. Furthermore, with patrols of this sort, there was the grave possibility of encountering the forces of the Occupation or the Policia, who might mistake their identity with disastrous results. Again, any carelessness in the selection of the members composing these patrols was potent with the danger of placing firearms in the hands of irresponsible, inefficient, and undisciplined persons—much to the detriment and chagrin of the Military Government.

Like so many problems affecting the population, the Occupation could not ignore giving some attention to the political side of the military induction of the civil population. Especially did reflection seem imperative in such cases, where the civil authorities or politicians sponsored movements associated with the military affairs of the Re-

embarrassment to the Military Government by making hosts of enemies among all classes of Dominicans. Evidently the leader interpreted the authority conferred upon him as carrying with it an unbridled license to commit depredations against the peaceful inhabitants, whose cause he had agreed to support by force of arms. According to reports, the history of the band was one of pillage and lawlessness, which necessitated the immediate disarming and disbandment of the group, and the placing of the leader under surveillance.

Another example where civil guards were utilized would tend to discredit many of the above objectionable features, and, moreover, offered, in lieu of, certain redeeming virtues. But in this instance, the most rigid control was exercised. The system used was similar in many respects to the method followed in the western part

of the United States when outlaws were numerous; namely, the employment of posses of civilians, inhabitants of the country in which the outlaws were operating, and who in a great many cases were impelled to action by some personal grievance against the outlaws. In Santo Domingo these groups consisted of the better known, more courageous and trustworthy citizens, practically all of whom were actuated by a grudge against the bandits. They were organized into small bands of not more than sixteen men. These small groups had the advantage of being highly mobile, easily concealed, and readily controlled. Each member of a group was thoroughly instructed by the armed forces of the Occupation in the use of the rifle and automatic pistol, especially, in firing rapidly and accurately at short ranges. The groups were not permitted to operate until they were competent to handle their firearms with some degree of skill, and with some knowledge of their powers and limitations. To obviate any promiscuous use of these weapons, they were kept locked in gun racks when not absolutely required.

Four groups were originally established at posts where the military forces were stationed. With some assurance of their success, three more groups were organized later. Each group was placed in charge of an officer, who supervised the training and accompanied the group when on patrol. In order not to restrict the initiative of the groups, or to interfere with their freedom of maneuver, this officer allowed the native leader to employ his own methods in the conduct of the patrol, but was, nevertheless, in a position to observe and correct the behavior of the group should the necessity arise.

The character or composition of the groups facilitated the gathering of information concerning the bandits, their movement, location of camps, and rendezvous. An inhabitant would have little or no hesitancy in giving pertinent information to the native leader of a group, that he would under no circumstances divulge to a member of the Occupation. As already cited the collection of bandit information was a most essential item looking towards the destruction of banditry.

Each patrol's operations were confined to a well defined section of the country with which all the members were thoroughly familiar. Upon the receipt of information of any bandit movement within an area, the proper group was ordered out, while all the armed forces of the Occupation were simultaneously directed to remain in their garrisons until the group was recalled. This precaution eliminated any possibility of mistaking the armed natives for bandit groups. This system possessed the marked advantage of keeping the bandits continually on the move.

A variation of this method, frequently consisted in sending out all the native groups, each group assiduously patrolling within its designated area for three consecutive days of a week. Upon their return, they were promptly relieved by the military patrols, which scoured the country for the remainder of the week.

The operations of these groups gave evidence of the confidence reposed in them for their behavior was irreproachable. They were able to secure a number of contacts with the bandit groups, and in each encounter conducted themselves in a most creditable manner, inflicting severe punishment on the bandits. Then again, the effect of witnessing their own countrymen assist the Military Government in the repression of lawlessness and disorder must have been demoralizing to the bandits. These patrols combined with the activities of the military forces were primarily conducive to the final suppression of banditry.

Shortly before the installation of the Provisional Government, the Military Government directed the severance of all relations with the native guards, although several of the sugar estates were authorized to retain their services. It was felt that with the installation of the Provisional Government any semblance of control over these civil guards by the forces of Occupation would create an unfavorable impression in the minds of Dominicans.

It is doubtful if this same system could have been successfully employed in the early days of the Occupation, in face of the general opposition to the Military Government and the mistrust of its purposes. In other words, a change in conditions demanded or permitted the application of new remedies to old ailments, that formerly would neither have been suitable nor advisable.

MAPS AND HANDBOOKS

As a narrative of the Brigade's activities, relative to the preparation and completion of military maps and a handbook of Santo Domingo has no direct bearing on the problems effecting the occupational or military rule of the Republic, the subject will be treated briefly. Yet this is in no way intended to belittle the magnitude and importance of the work, or to detract from the credit and praise due those officers and men who undertook and accomplished a most tedious and laborious task.

Not until late in 1921, did circumstances seem to favor or fully warrant the utilization of any considerable force to carry through to completion so significant an undertaking as the production of a combined map of Santo Domingo, augmented by additional data in the shape of handbooks and monographs. So a plan was prepared that set in operation a well directed and coordinated system of mapping, and the collection and compilation of other data, that could not be placed on maps, or otherwise dispensed with, because of its great importance.

Any task culminating in the efforts of several organizations required the concentration of control in a central authority, and in conformity with this rule, the Brigade Commander directed the Brigade Intelligence Office to assume immediate charge of all activities. Upon it fell the task of outlining all preliminary arrangements and the exercise of general supervision. Appreciating the value of attaining uniformity in procedure, and the necessity of facilitating and simplifying the innumerable details incident to a problem of these proportions, the Intelligence Department issued a series of mapping circulars. These circulars prescribed instructions regarding the proposed maps, instruments, sketching methods, conventional signs, standardizing strides, methods of computation, control maps, and miscellaneous instruments and data.

Each Regiment was made responsible for the mapping of its district. Regimental schools were instituted for the training of an ample personnel in mapping, using the subject matter of the mapping circulars as a basis for instruction. To retain continuity of control and to further systematize the work a mapping section was organized in each regimental intelligence office, with the intelligence officer directing all operations within the military district.

Approximately eighteen months were consumed in the preparation and final production of the maps and handbook. Six or eight months were devoted to the actual field work of mapping during which time about one hundred men were engaged in sketching. In order to expeditiously record, combine, and complete the great amount of material submitted, the office work was continuous over the entire period. In the year and a half the following maps were completed:

- (a) Strategic Map, scale 1:63360, consisting of forty-four sheets, covering the entire Republic.
- (b) Political, Judicial and Administrative Map, scale 1:15840, showing extent of provinces of the Republic, their communes, together with the latest census figures.
- (c) Road Map, scale 1:21120, consisting of ninety-six sheets, covering the most important areas of the Republic.
- (d) City or Town Maps, scale 1:4000, consisting of twelve sheets, which are composite of airplane photographic mosaics and ground maps, showing all important cities and towns of the Republic.

The Handbook of the Dominican Republic, 1922-1923, was prepared simultaneously with the maps, and appears in two parts: Part I consists of 253 pages covering the Southern and Eastern Districts; Part II consisting of 203 pages, covers the Northern District. This handbook is in tabular, graphical, pictorial, and descriptive form, and contains both original and research work. It was meticulously prepared as to verification of fact and statistics, and is a broad comprehensive study of the geographical features, climatic conditions, resources, industrial and economical conditions, communication systems, civil government, history, inhabitants and military defenses of Santo Domingo.

PROVOST DEPARTMENT

In an effort to give a clear portrayal of other tasks, that fell as a heritage to the Brigade, repeated mention must be made to the activities of the provost department. Therefore, in passing, occasion is taken to explain, somewhat in detail, the duties and organization of this important adjunct of the Military Government, and the extent of its influence in relation to the Occupation and Dominican people.

The status held by the provost marshal service was unique and distinctive, and it early proved an invaluable accessory to the efficient management of the administrative machinery of the Military Government. With the exception of a few native interpreters, the personnel of the provost offices was drawn exclusively from the Brigade, and, moreover, performed duties under the command of the Brigade. Nevertheless, the innate character of provost system, not only made it advisable, but necessary to maintain it as a separate and individual establishment, unhampered by the ordinary routine of Brigade affairs.

The provost department performed all those duties peculiar to its office, together with other tasks not generally assigned to this recognized institution of military occupations. The organization and disposition of the provost offices, while clearly marking a channel of command for the enforcement of many orders and mandates of the Occupation, simplified their execution, and overrode the many delays which otherwise would have meant a real loss to their effectiveness.

The Brigade records fail to show when the provost offices were first instituted, though presumably their establishment occurred either simultaneously with the announcement of the Occupation or shortly thereafter. Undoubtedly, a provost office, which later became known as the district provost office, was immediately installed at each regimental headquarters, and furthermore, it appears to have been customary to open a provost office promptly upon the establishment of any military post of importance. The number of offices varied at times, that is, they were opened or closed as the necessity demanded,



OZAMA RIVER, 1920

or abandoned with the withdrawal of garrisons to which regularly assigned. At one time there were as many as sixteen, all actively functioning and turning over a considerable amount of business. During the greater period of the Occupation an office was located at each provincial capital, where it was easily and readily accessible to the inhabitants, and, moreover, facilitated the execution of the orders of the Military Government in conjunction with the local civil officials.

Not until 1920 were the various provost offices really organized into a department. Prior to that time there seems to have been little or no connection between the different offices; each carried on its duties independently of the other within the limits of its jurisdiction. When Santo Domingo was divided into military districts, a district provost marshal was appointed at each district headquarters. This officer either by force of seniority or appointment did, in instances, exercise some administrative control over the provost offices of the district, and was even permitted to prescribe general methods of policy. However, this authority seems to have depended largely upon the degree of latitude and confidence the district commander was willing to repose in his subordinate. All records, reports, and recommendations relative to pertinent matters were forwarded or referred to the district commander and in some cases sent direct to Brigade Headquarters.

In September, 1920, the office of provost marshal general was established at Santo Domingo City. This office was charged with the administration of all provost offices, and even through constituted primarily for the purpose of regulating the collection and distribution of provost funds, resulted in a much closer amalgamation of the provost system.

The amount of personnel attached to the different offices bore no uniformity in strength, nor was the sphere of their activities equal in all respects. This was due entirely to the location of the various offices, together with extent of their duties and the strength of the commands to which they were attached. In one or two instances, the office was represented by the provost marshal himself, who was usually the senior officer present at the smaller posts. Frequently the personnel consisted of the provost marshal, a small office force, an interpreter, and a few military police; while again at the larger posts, especially at the district headquarters, the office was augmented by

an
cor
bri
of
sev

the
de
fat
ob
fol
qu

me
bu

an increased office force, a provost prison guard, and a considerable force of military police.

The object for which the department was maintained is briefly and best illustrated by the following duties, many of which were a matter of almost daily performance by several of the offices:

1. Maintenance of peace and order throughout the Republic.
2. Detention and bringing to justice offenders against the Executive Orders and the Proclamation of Intervention.
3. Repression of crime.
4. Enforcement of the Executive Orders and execution of the mandates of the Military Authority.
5. The trial of persons charged with offenses against the Military Government or the preparation of charges and specifications for the trial of persons by exceptional military courts.
6. Execution of sentences of exceptional military courts.
7. Arrest and detention of suspects. Investigation of reports bearing on important matters.
8. Special investigation of complaints made by civilians against members of the Occupation, Policia, municipal police, etc.
9. Observe civil officials in performance of their duties, and report any official found violating his trust.
10. Intelligence surveillance and espionage. (This in conjunction with the brigade and regimental intelligence sections.)
11. Custody of certain prisons and their inmates, enforcement of prison regulations and supervision of prison labor. Care and treatment of prisoners.
12. Issue and cancel firearm permits in accordance with Brigade Orders.
13. Control over the storage and release of firearms, ammunition, and explosives imported into the Republic. The sale of ammunition to persons possessing arms on permits.
14. The enforcement of the road laws and traffic regulations.
15. Receive and forward to the Department of Foreign Affairs all applications for passports made by Dominicans. To issue emergency passports when necessary.
16. Receive and forward to the American Legation, Santo Domingo City, certificates in case of Chinese requesting passports.

In order that the military authorities might be kept thoroughly informed of the many activities of the provost department, all of which more or less affected the entire fabric of the occupational administration, each office was obliged to submit numerous and sundry reports. The following were regularly submitted to Brigade Headquarters:


1. Monthly report of arm permits issued and cancelled.
2. Monthly report of provost funds.
3. Quarterly report of ammunition sold.
4. Quarterly report of provost prisoners to the Judge Advocate General of the Navy via Brigade Commander.
5. Report of investigations and provost courts when occurring.

The provost department, through a process of development and a knowledge of conditions gained by experience, built up a high state of efficiency, and combined with

the activities of the troops rendered the violation of the orders and decrees of the Military Government, if not extremely rare, at least precarious. It demonstrated on more than one occasion the undeniable right to be regarded as an indispensable attribute of the government of the Dominican Republic as administered by the Military Government of the United States, and was virtually an elemental corollary to the necessity of the Occupation. If the provost service was brought into being for the purpose of safeguarding the integrity of the Occupation, it was no less created for the reason of benefiting the inhabitants of the country. In fact the provost marshals were the representatives of the Occupation to the civil population, and acted as impartial intermediaries between the Military Government and the people. Not only did they look after the interests of the Occupation, but listened to the grievances and complaints of the inhabitants, and when within their scope and authority made the appropriate adjustment, or lacking the necessary power directed the individual to the proper place for adjudication. The very character of the duties of provost marshal offices made them, in truth, an important part of the police and judicial system of the Republic.

One difficulty prevailed within the provost department, which previous to the appointment of the provost marshal general's office, bid fair to undermine the efficiency and the maintenance of the offices. For several years the provost service was erroneously supported by various funds: Brigade Intelligence funds, Secretary of Interior and Police appropriations, certain small allotments from the Marine Corps, and fines imposed by sentences of provost courts. The aggregate amount of these contributions or revenues was not only unreliable but insufficient, and the provost marshals were continually casting about for other means of defraying the expenses of their offices.

Unfortunately the chief source of the above income was the penalizing of offenses committed by the inhabitants against the Military Government. The very idea of exercising justice for maintaining the provost offices by the imposition of fines was fundamentally wrong and repellant to a due sense of justice. Then again, it was calculated to offer undue temptation, for provost marshals or members of exceptional military courts might unthinkingly be moved to impose larger fines than the offenses warranted for the purpose of covering the expenses of the provost offices, realizing full well that the continuance of these offices was for the ultimate good of the people. Such a practice, if it had once been recognized by the Military



MARINE CORPS PACK TRAIN, SEIBO, D. R., 1930

Government would have been an invitation for the invidious condemnation of its methods in administering justice.

There seems to have been an unwillingness on the part of some of the authorities to concede that the cost of upkeep of the provost department was a legitimate expenditure of funds from the Dominican treasury, incident to defraying the expenses of the government of the occupied territory, and to admit fully that the provost service was dedicated to the improvement of the inhabitants and to the security of their lives and property. This contention, if it can be called such, was refuted, when in December 1920, the Military Governor issued an order stating that in the future the upkeep of the provost system would be borne by the Dominican treasury in so far as fines, etc., did not suffice to cover the necessary cost of the service. This action, while materially obviating further trouble, was the first official recognition of the provost system as constituting a part of the Dominican Government, notwithstanding the fact that it was an appendage of the Military Government; furthermore, that it in no way belonged to the Navy or Marine Corps, and therefore the cost of maintenance by the United States would have been an improper expenditure.

A few words should be spoken of the officers who served in the position of provost marshals as their selection had a great influence in establishing friendly relations with the inhabitants, and in the inculcation of the proper attitude of the members of the Occupation toward the inhabitants. The success of the provost offices depended largely upon the individual judgment and actions of the provost marshals. The selection of an officer unsuited for the performance of provost duties, either through a lack of the necessary qualifications or sympathy in the work, while probably not vitally derogatory to the interests of the Occupation, was not contemplated to promote its prestige and standing in the community. However, as a rule the choice of officers for these positions appears to have been well made, for a great many of the provost marshals, as their military records will attest, gained an enviable reputation among the inhabitants for fairness, impartiality, and kindly thoughtfulness, and were spoken of as "muy simpatico." The provost marshals were thrown in daily contact with the people and had the opportunity of studying their characteristics, customs, prejudices, and shortcomings. Possessed with an inflexible sense of justice and duty, together with a thorough knowledge of the inhabitants and a keen understanding of the object of the Occupation, the provost marshals made their offices serve a most admirable purpose, which was unsurpassed by any other institution or organization of the Military Government.

DISARMING THE POPULATION

The disarming of the Dominican people followed instantly upon the formal declaration of the Military Government, and must be regarded as the most drastic and effective step in the restoration of domestic tranquillity. This measure divested the inhabitants of the only physical means of protracting armed resistance, and conclusively convinced them of the futility of further opposition in the face of the new order of things.

Although the disarming of the native population of a country in military occupation will be the invariable rule, its application to the case of Santo Domingo was an immediate and imperative necessity. It was customary, as statistics later proved, for every man and boy, who could afford it to carry a firearm, notwithstanding that such possession was contrary to the Dominican law. There was a

logical and basic reason for the extraordinary large number of weapons in the hands of the inhabitants. The arbitrary methods whereby the political activities were carried on, frequently culminating in armed revolutions, and the lawlessness practiced by a perceptible portion of the population greatly influenced the conduct of human affairs in the Republic. The professional politician, and the revolutionary and bandit leader, together with their numerous cohorts were habitually armed. The legal institutions could not prevail against this distressing condition; persons and property were left to the mercy of unscrupulous despots, until in self preservation peaceful and law abiding inhabitants were forced to have recourse to arms. In this respect the Dominican people virtually constituted themselves an armed garrison.

No incident of the Occupation could have been fraught with graver consequences than a failure to deprive the Dominican people of all firearms and other deadly weapons. In this dispossession the Military Governor promptly removed one of the most likely causes for fostering enmity and hatred, and further served to cut off a large supply of firearms to the revolutionary and bandit leaders. An unprejudiced estimate would disclose in the light of past situations and circumstances that the disarming measures were as much, if not more, to the interest and protection of the Dominican people than to the forces of Occupation.

On November 29, 1916, the Military Governor issued the disarming order, forbidding all inhabitants to carry or have in their possession firearms, ammunition or explosives, except under exceptional circumstances of whose existence and duration the Military Government was the sole judge. This order was addressed to the Brigade Commander, directing that he place it in effect. It specified that the prohibited articles would be turned in to the proper officers of the forces of Occupation, who would receipt and care for such as were voluntarily surrendered, but that such articles as were not voluntarily surrendered would be confiscated. It further stipulated that the carrying of concealed weapons of any description was forbidden, and that any person cognizant of the above orders and knowingly violating them would be liable to punishment by the Military Government. As would be expected the details of carrying out the order, that is, the manner in which arms, ammunition and explosives would be turned in, and the methods that would be adopted in securing those prohibited articles not voluntarily surrendered, was left to the discretion of the Brigade Commander.

To give the order the force and character of a public notice, it was published in the "Gaceta Oficial" for the information and guidance of the citizens of the Republic. It might be well to mention here, that the "Gaceta Oficial" was the official publication of the Dominican Government, issued periodically and comprised a complete record of all the acts and laws enacted by the Government. This governmental record had a wide circulation, being distributed among the provincial, judicial, and municipal officials of the Republic. The Military Government continued to use this well established medium of expression for the official and public announcement of its executive and administrative orders. Therefore, on this occasion, as in many others, the Dominican officials became responsible for bringing the contents of the disarming order to the attention of the inhabitants and to impress upon them the significance of complying with the order.

It has not been possible to discover from the Brigade files, what written orders, if any, were issued to the armed forces simultaneously with the disarming proclamation, relative to the procedure to be followed in the collection of

PATRONIZE OUR ADVERTISERS

firea
been
was
their
erno
How
that
pron
the a
secu
TI
colle
dead
(a

(b
(c
(d

Fi
the
curre
the
sives
tary
ders
bal i
as to
surre
perso
was
nate

Gr
and
favor
scien
as de
acqu
offici
posit
man
place
other
reasc
this l
ing t
sures

Th
ing i
rede
for t
of ac
the le
It ga
worn
oppo
being
of ma
Misu
wise
cause
it reli
and
when
Occu
Ho

firearms and other deadly weapons. Furthermore, there has been no way to determine whether or not any time limit was fixed within which the inhabitants were to surrender their weapons. No date was specified in the Military Governor's order; it apparently was not deemed practicable. However, it is manifest from a reading of certain papers that the Military Government did lay great stress upon prompt obedience to the disarming proclamation, and that the armed forces instituted the most energetic measures to secure all firearms in possession of the Dominican people.

The following forces or agencies were employed in the collection of firearms, ammunition, explosives and other deadly weapons:


- (a) Provincial governors and local police authorities, particularly jefes comunales (communal chiefs) jefes de orden (chief of police) and alcaldes pedaneos (rural policemen).
- (b) The forces of the Brigade.
- (c) Special agents or operators of the Brigade intelligence office or provost marshal department.
- (d) The forces of the Policia.

From an examination of the records, it is inferred that the civil authorities received supplementary orders, occurring with the disarming proclamation, stating explicitly the manner in which firearms, ammunition and explosives would be collected and later turned over to the military forces. There are evidences of where field commanders visited various towns and communes, and issued verbal instructions to the local officials imposing restrictions as to the time and place the prohibited articles would be surrendered. The civil officials were either obliged to make personal delivery of the collected articles, or a detachment was sent to procure them at some place previously designated.

Great quantities of firearms were collected by this means and contrary to expectations met with more success and favor than first predicted. Many of the civil officials conscientiously complied with the demands made upon them as demonstrated by the expeditious manner in which they acquired large number of firearms. However, some of the officials, considering the disarming order an unjust imposition, performed their duties in a most perfunctory manner, while a few, unworthy of any trust that could be placed in them, disarmed some of the people and permitted others to retain their weapons for personal or monetary reasons. In some instances, the inhabitants reacted against this behavior on the part of the local authorities by reporting the maleficent official, and suggested that other measures be taken to collect their weapons.

The disarming of the inhabitants through the intervening instrumentality of the civil officials possessed many redeeming features over the utilization of the armed forces for the same purpose. It was the most peaceful means of accomplishing the desired object, less provocative, and the least likely to engender antagonism and end in friction. It gave the peaceful and law-abiding citizens, who were worn out by the constant political abuse of the past, the opportunity to gracefully hand over their weapons without being subjected to what they might consider the indignity of making a personal surrender to the military authorities. Misunderstandings were avoided that would have otherwise occurred had the armed forces been employed, because of a difference in language and custom. Moreover, it relieved the armed forces of an unpleasant responsibility and eliminated the factor of personal contact at a time when the population must have viewed the intentions of the Occupation with considerable doubt and suspicion.

However, it is not to be assumed from the success al-



SAN PEDRO DE MACORIS, D. R.

ready noted that an order so exacting and far reaching in its effect was to meet with a willing and universal compliance. An appreciable percentage of the inhabitants deliberately failed to surrender their firearms or reluctantly obeyed the summons of the order. As a consequence of this attitude, it was necessary as a military measure to resort to the most drastic methods; the employment of the military force followed, in order to compel the recalcitrants to surrender their weapons. Either the civil officials were made to secure the prohibited articles, or the armed forces conducted a house to house search for concealed weapons. These forcible measures while not tending to promote good feeling were unavoidable and wholly justifiable in the effort for an early return of peace and order.

There were incidents where special agents or operators of the Brigade Intelligence Office and the provost marshal offices made collection of deadly weapons. In these enterprises, action was taken on more or less reliable information relative to the hiding or retention of large quantities of firearms and ammunition by certain notorious individuals. The success of these operations depended upon the skill and courage of the agent as he had to rely solely upon his own initiative and resources. In December 1916, an operator from the Brigade Intelligence Office made a trip to the San Juan valley and the Haitian border and succeeded in returning to Santo Domingo City with 826 rifles and over 14,000 rounds of ammunition. The trip was made in less than three weeks, practically alone and unassisted, and at great personal risk to the operator. He fearlessly confronted the rulers of San Juan valley and intimidated them into surrendering their weapons.

With the establishment of the Guardia, this organization assisted the Brigade in the collection and confiscation of firearms. It performed notable services in this connection, and as a native constabulary force had the marked advantage of ferreting out the more difficult and pertinacious cases.

In June, 1917, the Brigade Commander issued an order directing that in the future, Marines and Guardia would be the only persons authorized to represent the Military Government in the collection of arms. What may have been the occasion of this order, the writer has no way of knowing, though it is imagined that the Military Government now proposed to deprive the civil officials of further authority or interference in the matter, and concluded that the inhabitants had had sufficient time in which to

(Continued on page 52)